tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3163957708245233467.post4795805281730840313..comments2024-03-28T10:20:27.809-07:00Comments on Pro-Life Philosophy: Bodily Rights ArgumentsClinton Wilcoxhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17018335374680419858noreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3163957708245233467.post-50724188939418003892016-04-05T17:58:35.678-07:002016-04-05T17:58:35.678-07:00So regarding your organ transplant example, any ch...So regarding your organ transplant example, any change I undergo that does not kill me retains my identity. This means that if I lose my arm in an industrial accident and replace it with a bionic one (even though this bionic arm may have abilities I did not have with my natural arms), I still remain "me" because this change did not kill me. Or if you replace my kidney with a transplant, I remain "me" because that change did not kill me. In the example of the rational dog, it is not the change in the canine's organ that causes it to become a new substance, it is that the very nature of the canine changed; so the non-rational canine ceased to exist and a new, rational supercanine came into existence.<br /><br />Regarding your question about active capabilities, if you mean what I think you do, then yes, it would constitute an active capability. Human beings are sexual beings, meaning that it is in their nature to reproduce sexually; production of genetic material (i.e. the sperm and ovum) facilitates sexual reproduction, so the humans have the inherent capacity which becomes presently exercisable once the proper age has been reached.Clinton Wilcoxhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17018335374680419858noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3163957708245233467.post-55052740174385827882016-04-05T17:58:08.498-07:002016-04-05T17:58:08.498-07:00Hi Sean:
Thanks! I'm glad you enjoy my writin...Hi Sean:<br /><br />Thanks! I'm glad you enjoy my writings. I'm happy to answer your questions. Also, I think the Substance View is the best argument for the pro-life position.<br /><br />A substance is an entity that retains its identity through change. A substance is ontologically prior to its parts, meaning that not only does the substance, itself, exist before its parts do, but also that the substance's nature determines its parts, not the other way around (as is true for artifacts, in which their parts are ontologically prior to the artifact, itself). There is much more to be said about the concept of substance, but this suffices for the Substance View, on the surface.<br /><br />Regarding the Beckwith example, I do have the book, but it's been a while since I've read it. I don't have it nearby, so I'm not sure if I'm responding the best that I can. I may adjust my view slightly after having a chance to review the book, if I've missed something.<br /><br />But regarding the example from the dog, I'm not convinced by science fiction thought experiments, namely because there's no way of knowing how plausible they are. We know quite a bit about the brain, but there's still a lot we don't know. Especially the fact that we've never transplanted a brain before. The person who, for example, says that you can take my brain out of my body, transplant it into another person's body, and that will be "me" in the new body, and not the original person, is assuming a particular metaphysical view, namely monism, that "I" am my brain. They deny a metaphysical reality to the human person. I don't think it's at all clear that I can transfer my consciousness if I transfer my brain, and I don't think it's at all clear (or even plausible) that if you remove the rational part of my brain and attach it to a dog's brain, that the dog can begin to think rationally. I don't think that's a valid argument against the Substance View, since you have to assume a particular metaphysical view in order to support it, one already opposed to the Substance View. In other words, this response begs the question regarding whether monism or dualism is true.<br /><br />Beckwith's a really smart guy (and the guy who turned me on to the Substance View), so it feels weird to say this, but I think my response is better, or at least more intuitive, than Beckwith's.<br /><br />However, I think Beckwith's response takes the idea of the detractor at their word. So what Beckwith is really getting at is that it's not in the nature of canines to be rational, but it is in the nature of humans to be rational. So a dog who became rational would not be a dog in the relevant sense, since this new canine is rational. Since canines are not rational, and this canine becomes rational, that means that the old canine ceases to be once rationality emerges (since it is not in the nature of canines to be rational) and becomes a brand new substance, a supercanine, if you will. That is what Beckwith means when he says the old canine substance and brain-part ceased to be and a brand new substance came into existence. It's the same thing as when the sperm and the egg create a new human being. The sperm and ovum are two different substances, but when they merge, they cease to exist and a brand new human substance comes into existence. Even though the human being develops from the ovum with the genetic material of the sperm, the fertilization process brings a brand new substance into existence.Clinton Wilcoxhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17018335374680419858noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3163957708245233467.post-89238743666078729152016-04-04T17:17:14.811-07:002016-04-04T17:17:14.811-07:00Hello Clinton,
I've enjoyed your post here and...Hello Clinton,<br />I've enjoyed your post here and at Secular Prolife. I figured that since you are a defender of the Substance View, you can help me understand it better.<br /><br />In "Defending Life", Francis Beckwith responds to an objection that the human substance has the active capability to be rationality from its conception onward. The objection took the form of a thought experiment. A surgeon somehow implants part of a human's brain in a dog. The dog stays itself, but now has a capability to be rational - thus a substance can gain this ability.<br /><br />Beckwith dispatches this easily, since it springs from a misunderstanding of active or intrinsic capabilities and immediately exercisable ones. That, and the dog and the human brain part cease to be and a new substance forms. Thus the new substance always had rationality as an intrinsic capability.<br /><br />My question is, what if I get an organ transplant and the organ I get differs from my original one? Say it produces a chemical that no other organ has. Would I cease to be, would a new substance arise from the combination of me and that donor organ? This seems absurd to me (since the production of a new chemical is so trivial), but I expect you can shed some light on it.<br /><br />(Another related question: Would the replication of genetic material constitute an active capability?)<br /><br />If you have time, I would appreciate your thoughts on the matter.<br /><br />Take care,<br />Sean Killackey<br /><br />P.S. My email is timesedge2014@gmail.com<br /><br />Sean Killackeyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08683592785735127212noreply@blogger.com